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ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n Migration scholars can 
help to steer the debate over 
immigration policy—which 
is big on rhetoric and small 
on evidence—toward more 
productive areas.
n Immigrant apprehensions— 
a reasonable indicator of 
unauthorized immigrant 
inflows—have fallen 
dramatically over the past 
two decades.
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In the 1980s, following a sustained shift in the 
source of U.S. immigrants, academics, the U.S. 
public, and legislative officials engaged in healthy 
debate about the U.S. immigration system. The 
discussion eventually led to the passage of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
of 1986. This legislation contained two major 
provisions. First, it provided legal residency status 
for some undocumented immigrants who had 
continuously resided in the United States for a 
period of time. Its second provision was to impose 
sanctions on employers that knowingly hired 
undocumented immigrants. The IRCA’s intention 
was to bring undocumented immigrants “out of 
the shadows” while putting an end to the pull of 
unauthorized immigrants from employers. 
We are currently experiencing another 
intense period of debate about immigration. The 
discussion today is broader and pertains to both 
illegal and legal immigration. It has transcended 
geographic borders and even extends beyond 
immigration to Brexit (the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the European Union), the 
contributions of the international trading system 
to poverty and prosperity, and the costs and 
benefits of social uniformity versus diversity. In 
short, current conversations focus on finding the 
ideal balance between globalization and tighter 
borders. Of concern, however, is the tone of these 
debates taking place at home and abroad. It is more 
visceral, more extreme, more emotional, and more 
uncomfortable than 30 years ago when IRCA was 
passed. 
The public today is fiercely divided about 
U.S. immigration. On one side, immigrants are 
characterized as undeserving, taking advantage of 
a generous welfare system, and criminal in nature. 
Another side appeals to American ideals and lauds 
the U.S. immigration system as the foundation 
for our present-day society—a melting pot giving 
rise to American ingenuity and creativity through 
diversity. A huge gulf exists between the two sides, 
as is evidenced by intransience in the Congress on 
the question of immigration policy, by the series 
of presidential executive orders and their reversals 
from court rulings, and by vocal public opinion.
The current debate is big on rhetoric and 
small on evidence, with the issues having been 
framed in terms of the personal, making true 
discourse difficult at best. Migration scholars, 
however, can help to steer the discussion 
toward more productive areas. One way they 
can provide more clarity is with respect to very 
basic information concerning the alleged surge 
in illegal immigration. According to the current 
administration, the United States is experiencing 
a deluge in undocumented immigrant inflows. In 
fact, basic data—specifically, reports from the U.S. 
government—show otherwise. One indicator of 
the levels of illegal immigration today are tallies of 
the apprehension levels by the border patrol and 
other immigration officials. Figure 1 presents this 
data from the Department of Homeland Security 
from 2000 to the present. The chart clearly shows 
that apprehensions, an imperfect yet reasonable 
indicator of variations in the level of inflows, 
have in fact fallen dramatically over the past two 
decades. Current apprehension levels are less than 
one-third of their levels in 2000. Levels this low 
were last observed in 1972, even though dollar and 
personnel resources devoted to the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, and to U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement, have risen substantially 
from 2000 to the present (see American 
Immigration Council [2017]). 
While the Department of Homeland Security 
data suggest that the flow of undocumented 
immigrants has been declining overall, this is not 
true of the number of undocumented immigrants 
already in the United States. The common 
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Barriers to mobility converted 
the undocumented from a circular 
and temporary population in the 
U.S. into a permanent feature.
perception is that, after undocumented 
crossings became more onerous and 
risky because of enhanced border 
enforcement, the existing stock of 
unauthorized immigrants tended to 
permanently settle in the United States. 
Instead of periodically visiting home 
and maintaining roots there, with 
expectations of an eventual permanent 
return, the undocumented dug in more 
deeply. Barriers to mobility converted 
the undocumented from a circular and 
temporary population in the United 
States into a permanent feature, as 
outlined by Massey, Durand, and Pren 
(2016). Data are supportive of this 
idea, with the stock of undocumented 
steadily rising in concert with 
increases in immigration enforcement 
(Krogstad, Passel, and  Cohn 2017). 
Immigrants became more entrenched 
by longer continuous tenure due to the 
larger costs of periodically returning 
home, which in turn resulted in 
more U.S.-born children and greater 
commitments to making the United 
States home. 
The general public’s lack of 
basic education about immigration 
contributes to an unproductive 
discussion about immigrants. A recent 
poll by the Pew Research Center (2018) 
reveals that a majority of Americans 
believe there are more undocumented 
than documented immigrants in the 
United States today, when in fact only 
about one-quarter of all immigrants are 
unauthorized. 
Why are immigrants, whether 
documented or not, less welcome 
today? Why has chain migration—the 
concept that settled immigrants will 
attract other family to migrate—
become a dirty phrase? Several factors 
and significant levels of misinformation 
have likely contributed to rolling up the 
welcome mat. A common charge is that 
immigrants take jobs away from the 
native born. There exists an extensive 
literature that attempts to measure the 
degree to which immigrants compete 
with the native-born in the job market 
(see National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine [2017], 
specifically Chapter 5, for a review of 
the studies). A common finding is that 
the recent low-skilled immigrants do 
tend to compete with existing low-
skilled workers, particularly with more 
seasoned immigrants, but also with a 
small segment of the U.S. native-born 
labor force—high school dropouts. 
Other studies find that the presence 
of immigrant workers raises the 
productivity of native-born workers 
along with their earnings. The dynamic 
contributions of immigration to the 
economy—providing a source of labor 
in an era of declining birth rates—are 
increasingly recognized. With a few 
exceptions, there is little evidence that 
native workers are disadvantaged by 
immigration.
An important reason for relatively 
low competition between immigrants 
and the native born involves mobility 
by immigrants—particularly those who 
are low-skilled—who tend to exhibit 
high degrees of geographic mobility 
(Cadena and Kovak 2016). They are 
less stuck to a particular geographic 
area, moving to fill job vacancies in 
more distant areas, in areas where 
economic growth is highest and greater 
excess demand for workers exists. Table 
1 presents evidence of this greater 
mobility, with information on the 
percentage of those born within the 
50 U.S. states (native-born) and the 
percent of nonnaturalized immigrants, 
who moved to their current location 
from a noncontiguous U.S. state in the 
past year. 
Two points are worth noting. 
First, immigrants are more apt to 
move, as revealed by the percentages 
displayed. For example, in 2001, 
only 1.6 percent of natives moved to 
a noncontiguous state, whereas 2.1 
percent of nonnaturalized immigrants 
did. Immigrants “grease” the labor 
market, possibly permitting the 
economy faster economic growth by 
more efficiently allocating workers 
to where they are needed. This also 
explains perhaps why immigrants are 
not directly competing with natives, as 
they quickly tend to move onward if 
the labor market is slack. Second, over 
the past two decades there has been 
a gradual reduction in the mobility 
of nonnaturalized immigrants. 
Using this metric, 2.1 percent of the 
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SOURCE: Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2016/table33 


















Figure 1  Undocumented Immigrant Apprehensions, 2000–2016 
nonnaturalized population in 2001 
moved between noncontiguous states 
while only 1.6 percent did in 2016. 
This could be because of changes in 
the vintages of the immigrants (and 
their characteristics) or because of 
the greater scrutiny immigrants are 
experiencing. The increases in interior 
enforcement might be tying down 
immigrants more firmly to current 
locations where they may more easily 
blend. 
Another concern about immigrants 
that may be contributing to greater 
animosity is the charge that 
immigrants—both documented and 
undocumented—and refugees display 
more criminal behavior than the native 
born. Here again, migration scholars 
can offer carefully crafted studies 
that use representative data in place 
of anecdotes to ascertain the actual 
contributions of refugees, immigrants, 
and the undocumented to crime in the 
United States. Those studies provide 
ample evidence that runs counter to 
the notion that these groups exhibit 
higher rates of criminality. Chalfin 
(2015), for example, shows that recent 
immigration flows have contributed 
toward driving down crime rates. 
And in specifically analyzing refugee 
flows into the United States, Amuedo-
Dorantes, Bansak, and Pozo (2018) 
find no causal evidence that refugees 
have impacted violent crime rates in 
the United States. 
More attention must be paid 
to serious analysis of immigration 
and data about immigrants and 
their influence on the economy. 
The forthcoming book titled The 
Human and Economic Implications 
of Twenty-First Century Immigration 
Policy (Upjohn Press) presents the 
findings of prominent immigration 
scholars who use data and theory 
to help unravel facts concerning 
immigration. This book provides a 
framework that helps move us from 
the personal to the analytical, to 
facilitate a more systematic appraisal 
of immigration and the policies 
before us. The authors document and 
provide careful analyses along several 
dimensions, from the fiscal impacts 
of immigrants in the United States, 
assimilation along generational lines, 
the effects of enhanced immigration 
enforcement at the interior of 
the United States, and alternative 
blueprints for allocating refugees. The 
authors also offer suggestions on the 
use of tools of international trade to 
assess immigration policy today. The 
public must be better informed to more 
effectively debate immigration, and this 
volume can help set us on that path. 
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This article draws on concepts highlighted in the 
forthcoming book The Human and Economic 
Implications of Twenty-First Century Immigration Policy, 
soon to be published by the Upjohn Institute. Visit https://
upjohn.org/publications/upjohn-institute-press/human 
-and-economic-implications-twenty-first-century 
-immigration for more information. 
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Table 1  Mobility of U.S.-Born and Noncitizens Aged 25–64 
NOTE: Individuals born in U.S. territories (e.g., Puerto Rico) were excluded from the analysis. 
SOURCE: Computed from ACS one-year samples, IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org. 
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